Despite his rhetoric about democracy and inclusivity, Syria’s new president is steering the country back toward military dictatorship.
At the Victory Conference on January 29, Ahmed al-Sharaa stood in military fatigues before an audience of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) members and Islamist militia leaders as he was declared Syria’s transitional president. Alongside this announcement, he suspended the constitution and ordered that all armed factions be dissolved and integrated into the state, laying the foundation for his rule. While this officially includes HTS, the group is being embedded into the state at all levels, with its members securing key positions in political, security, and administrative institutions. The transitional government, formed on March 30, grants HTS full control over the justice, interior, defense, and foreign affairs ministries, while assigning token roles to a handful of minority figures, including one woman.
To further cement his authority, Sharaa organized sham committees to oversee the National Dialogue Conference and draft a new constitutional declaration. The National Dialogue Conference, initially intended to unite all segments of Syrian society to shape the nation’s future, was reduced to a stage-managed event of pre-approved individuals, serving only to legitimize the new authorities. The resulting constitutional declaration formalized his absolute authority under the guise of legal reform, enshrining Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of legislation, abolishing the prime ministerial office, and granting the president full control over the legislature through the direct appointment power of a third of the People’s Assembly. He is also empowered to issue laws and veto legislation, which can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority.
Despite his rhetoric about democracy, inclusivity, and institution-building, Sharaa is unmistakably steering Syria back toward a military-led dictatorship. Yet, his grip on power is already facing serious challenges. Despite his push for consolidation, Damascus is struggling to secure a monopoly on arms, with rival factions resisting disarmament. Meanwhile, the euphoria of Assad’s downfall is rapidly fading as lawlessness spreads, sectarian violence escalates, and the economy remains paralyzed by sanctions in the absence of a meaningful transition. Sharaa’s consolidation perpetuates a longstanding cycle in Syria, where military strongmen seize power under the pretext of restoring stability, only to fuel internal divisions and entrench authoritarian rule. However, as Syria’s history shows, military dominance does not guarantee control, nor does it ensure survival.
Between 1946 and 1970, Syria experienced ten successful coups and numerous failed ones before Hafez al-Assad finally consolidated power. While often framed as responses to government failure, military takeovers ensured that no civilian government could ever fully succeed in governing the country. Upon gaining independence in 1946, Syria operated as a democracy in principle but lacked a unified vision of governance, clear separation of powers, and strong institutions.
Political authority was shaped by factional rivalries and patronage networks, ensuring that the military remained deeply entangled in politics. Civilian elites leveraged military connections to undermine political rivals or deploy the army as an internal police force to suppress dissent. Conversely, military officers used politicians to expand their own influence. At the same time, the military itself was not a unified institution. In the absence of strong civilian leadership, its expanding influence transformed it into a battleground for competing ideologies and foreign interference.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War shattered confidence in civilian rule, leading many officers to see military rule as Syria’s only path to stability. In 1949, Husni al-Za’im, with support from the CIA, staged Syria’s first coup. While Za’im ruled for only 137 days, he set a lasting precedent for military intervention. That same year, two more coups followed, first by pro-Hashemite Sami al-Hinnawi, then by nationalist Adib al-Shishakli. Initially ruling from behind the scenes, Shishakli moved to consolidate military control before dissolving civilian rule in December 1951, effectively establishing Syria’s first military dictatorship. He expanded Syria’s security apparatus, banned political parties, and repressed Ba’athists and communists, forcing many into exile.
His purges and promotion of rural Sunni officers, particularly from his home region of Hama, alienated urban elites and fuelled resentment within the officer corps. Viewing the Druze as a threat to his rule, he sent the army to Suweida, ordering attacks on villages and the arrest of key leaders to curb their influence. By 1954, his centralization, favoritism, and repression united a broad coalition against him, leading to his overthrow. Civilian rule returned in name, but the military remained dominant yet internally divided, fuelling continued instability.
As Cold War tensions grew, ideological struggles became central to political rivalries. Arab nationalism and leftist movements gained widespread appeal, particularly after the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the 1956 Suez Crisis. Ba’athism in particular resonated with marginalized communities and rural populations, many of whom viewed the military as a vehicle for social mobility. This allowed them to expand their influence within the armed forces, with Homs Military Academy becoming a key center for recruitment and indoctrination.
The Western-backed coup attempts of 1956–1957 deepened anti-Western sentiment, prompting purges and strengthening Syria’s alignment with the Soviet Union. Amid ongoing instability—and fearing another foreign-backed coup and the Communist Party’s rise—Ba’athists, Nasserists, and allied officers pursued union with Egypt, forming the United Arab Republic in 1958. The UAR profoundly reshaped Syria’s political landscape by abolishing political parties and imposing state control over the economy, which entrenched a centralized bureaucracy and weakened the traditional elite. Though the union collapsed after three years due to resentment toward Egypt, it had already laid the foundation for a one-party state. Civilian rule briefly returned in 1961 but proved too fragile to last, paving the way for the Ba’athist takeover in 1963.
Framed as an ideological revolution, the Ba’athists restructured the state by dismantling political pluralism, nationalizing key sectors, and entrenching their rule. Moderate civilian factions clashed with the military’s radical socialist wing, leading to the 1966 coup, in which Salah Jadid’s hardliners ousted President Amin al-Hafiz and purged their rivals. Although initially diverse, the Ba’ath Party’s power consolidation became increasingly sectarian, as the coup sidelined Sunni nationalists and expanded Alawite influence in the military. Jadid’s ideological rigidity and confrontational foreign policy eroded his military support. As Minister of Defence, Assad positioned himself as a pragmatic alternative, especially after Syria’s disastrous performance in the Six-Day War in 1967. He then exploited the military’s discontent over Jadid’s handling of Black September to overthrow him in the 1970 Corrective Movement.
Once in power, Assad legitimized his rule through cosmetic power-sharing via the Ba’athaist-controlled National Progressive Front, maintaining a façade of pluralism. He selectively liberalized the economy, building a business elite and patronage networks under his control. To solidify power, he co-opted Sunnis into government while entrenching Alawite dominance in the military and security apparatus, particularly favoring those from his home village of Qardaha.
However, it was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and his broader foreign policy that truly cemented his rule. Despite failing to retake the Golan Heights, he used the war to portray himself as Syria’s defender. With Syria becoming a regional power, substantial Soviet economic and military aid followed, enabling Assad to expand the armed forces, strengthen internal security, and grow the state bureaucracy. Yet, his ability to establish a personalist dictatorship—and ultimately a dynasty that would rule Syria for over five decades—was not solely a result of his own manoeuvring. It was made possible by the foundations laid by seven years of Ba’athist rule and two decades of extensive military purges.
Sharaa is mirroring many of Assad’s consolidation tactics but adapting them to an Islamist framework. Power is concentrated among a handful of loyalists from Idlib and family members, while he embeds ideology into state institutions and the armed forces. However, he faces far greater domestic and geopolitical challenges. Fourteen years of civil war have left Syria’s institutions hollowed out, the state fractured, and the economy in ruins. While Syria’s military has historically suffered from factional divisions, it maintained a professional corps under a centralized command.
Sharaa, by contrast, relies on a fragmented network of undisciplined militias with competing loyalties, many of which espouse extremist ideologies. His hardline Islamist rule further alienates large segments of Syrian society and deepens sectarian divisions, while his terrorist designation isolates him internationally, worsening his legitimacy crisis. The recent large-scale killings in the coastal region, which targeted Alawite communities, have intensified sectarian hostilities, reinforcing the belief that his rule will fuel further instability and radicalization. These vulnerabilities are compounded by the absence of an extensive intelligence service to suppress dissent, repeated Israeli airstrikes on military installations, and a severe manpower shortage straining the armed forces and state bureaucracy.
It is worth noting that HTS is estimated to have only around 30,000 fighters. In contrast, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) each reportedly number approximately 70,000. Sharaa faces significant challenges in integrating these factions into a unified force. To minimize the risk of a coup, he seeks to incorporate fighters individually rather than allowing them to retain any autonomy. However, most factions insist on integrating as blocs, maintaining their command structures and the land they have fought for.
To the north, factions within the SNA continue to operate autonomously with their own leadership and strongholds. In the northeast, despite an agreement with the SDF on integration and a ceasefire, major disputes remain over implementation and governance. The SDF has formally rejected the transitional government and continues to demand a decentralized, pluralist state. In the south, negotiations with Ahmad al-Awda’s forces in Daraa have stalled, while Druze factions in Suweida refuse to integrate into a centralized Islamist structure. Meanwhile, in the Alawite-dominated coastal region, factions of the former regime are mobilizing with support from Iran.
Beyond Syria’s borders, Sharaa’s Islamist leadership and the country’s internal instability have raised alarm across the region. Only Qatar and Erdoğan’s Turkey have positioned themselves as close allies of the new regime, though the latter is currently grappling with widespread anti-government protests at home. Egypt and the UAE view Sharaa’s government as a potentially destabilizing force due to its radical Islamist orientation. Israel, meanwhile, fears an Islamist regime on its border could wage asymmetric warfare through jihadist proxies or supply arms to Palestinian militant groups. In response, the IDF has intensified operations in Syria, reportedly destroying 80 percent of the country’s military capabilities, and is demanding that no HTS-aligned forces operate south of Damascus. As factions mobilize and bide their time to challenge Sharaa’s rule, foreign powers will inevitably begin offering varying degrees of support, further complicating his efforts to consolidate power.
After fifty-four years of authoritarianism, Syrians are no longer willing to accept tyranny for the illusion of order. With opposition mounting at home and abroad, the question is not whether someone will challenge Sharaa’s rule, but when.
About the Author:
Kelly Kassis is a geopolitical analyst focusing on the Middle East and Russia and the Director of International Relations at the Center for Political and Foreign Affairs.
Image: Mohammed Bash / Shutterstock.com.
