Small modular reactors (SMRs) may be the way to a greener future, but there is a price to be paid if atomic energy regulators neglect their safety as well.
Small modular reactors (SMRs) seem to be the rising star of the nuclear energy industry. Compared to traditional, large nuclear reactors, which are capable of producing around 1,000 -1,500 megawatts of electrical power (MWe), SMRs are defined as having maximum outputs of 300 MWe. Despite nominally generating less electric energy, SMRs have been lauded as having faster, scalable construction, lower costs, and more flexible siting than conventional nuclear reactors, while affording a safer and more secure operation. Although no SMR has yet been built in the United States, these proposed attributes make them appear as an attractive technological option to bolster energy security and decarbonize various industries.
In the United States, SMRs have drawn the attention of the artificial intelligence (AI) technology sector, where companies working on cutting-edge large-language models are spurring greater energy demand. According to the Department of Energy projections, data centers are expected to consume 6.7-twelve percent of total U.S. electricity by 2028. To assuage concerns that this increase in demand would saddle the AI industry with an enormous carbon footprint, U.S. tech companies have embarked on a spree to secure nuclear power deals last fall; for example, Google and Amazon recently signed SMR contracts for their data centers. Soaring interest in this technology unlocked over $1.5 billion in funding for SMR developers in the last year, and some companies pledged to deploy their first reactors within this decade.
Washington is also keen on SMRs. Most recently, the Trump administration announced its ambition to “enable the rapid deployment and export of next-generation nuclear technology.” Meanwhile, other countries with significant presence in the nuclear energy industry proceed with their own SMR development. Russia and China each already operate a nuclear power plant with small reactors domestically. While it remains to be seen how the global race to commercialize SMRs will unfold, U.S. firms face mounting financial and geopolitical pressures to accelerate deployment.
Yet, even amidst domestic and international pressures, American policymakers and industry leaders should resist the urge to recklessly speed up SMR deployment. When it comes to nuclear energy, the cost of “moving fast and breaking things” is too high. Instead, embracing the principles of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards will ensure that SMRs do not exacerbate the risks of nuclear catastrophes, contamination, and proliferation.
Unstable Guardrails
Advocates of SMRs suggest that the reactors could be safer and more secure. Various design features, including sealed cores, lower fissile material volumes, and smaller physical footprints, could allegedly increase proliferation resistance. Additionally, some SMRs are said to be constructed with passive safety systems which will not require active intervention to shut down operations or remediate major problems.
However, SMRs will also present new challenges. The diversity of SMRs designs, fast speed of construction, and relative mobility and transferability could complicate regulatory efforts that oversee nuclear reactors and ensure safety of operations, security of facilities, and safeguarding of nuclear materials and sensitive technologies from proliferation risks. All commercial nuclear reactors operating in the United States today are light-water reactors; they are large in size and have long construction times. In contrast, SMRs are more compact in size and produce smaller thermal signatures, which could increase the challenge of remote monitoring efforts. Moreover, depending on the design, SMRs may complicate on-site monitoring efforts, such as through the use of opaque coolants or integrated systems that are incompatible with visual and intermittent monitoring methods.
Adding to the complexity, SMRs are being developed in an evolving and piecemeal regulatory landscape. At the national level, nuclear regulations are established and enforced by independent regulatory bodies. Therefore, each country with nuclear power programs has its own set of standards to reinforce safety, security, and safeguards. While these bodies should be independent, so as not to be affected by conflicts of interest, they often coordinate with international organizations to share best practices, receive consultations, and undergo “peer review.”
One of the most important international entities that national regulatory bodies coordinate with is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An independent body of the United Nations, the IAEA serves as an international watchdog to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, while safeguarding against proliferation risks. It creates international standards and regulations that are adopted by national regulatory bodies; it also oversees safeguard agreements that are intended to prevent the diversion of materials for peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes. However, the extent of the IAEA’s oversight varies depending on a country’s commitments under international treaties and agreements.
This could create a confusing patchwork of legislation to manage SMR production, export, and operation. Take the United States and South Korea as examples. The United States has its own national regulatory body – the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It may also offer to subject its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, though inviting international oversight is not compulsory given the United States’s role as a nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Meanwhile, South Korean SMR development will be regulated by the South Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). However, since South Korea is a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT, all of its SMRs must also be subjected to IAEA safeguards. The two countries recently pledged to strengthen coordination of their nuclear export controls, which was required in the case of South Korea’s plans to build an APR1000 nuclear power plant in Czechia. As SMRs enter the global market, these regulatory disparities could create uncertainty without sufficient time for international coordination.
Moreover, political shifts in Washington could weaken domestic regulatory guardrails in the United States. Trump administration policies that threaten to erode the NRC’s independence, along with calls for rapid SMR deployment, could create pressure for more relaxed regulations and standards.
Imperative for Caution
Given this evolving regulatory landscape, industry leaders who are responsible for developing and utilizing SMRs have it in their interest to take a more proactive role in reinforcing the existing guardrails.
Companies seeking to export SMR technology abroad should proactively engage with IAEA officials and professionals with legal and technical expertise in safeguards. The Agency holds a vital role in coordinating nuclear trade regulations and evaluating and overseeing reactor designs and facility construction plans. As one example, it is currently assessing the safety of Romania’s planned site for a NuScale SMR power plant at Doicești. In addition to following the model set by NuScale for early IAEA engagement, firms could also adopt the Agency’s “safeguards by design” principles, which offer recommendations to ensure that SMRs are constructed in a way that would ease safeguard burdens.
The good news is that the IAEA itself has already expressed interest in engaging directly with private stakeholders. Programs such as the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative and the Technical Safety Review Service offer avenues for industry to request technical evaluations and collaborate with IAEA experts, national regulators, and research institutions on reinforcing the global regulatory landscape. The Agency also plans to convene its first International Symposium on AI and Nuclear Energy this year, highlighting SMRs as a key prospective solution to meet growing energy demand. It is worthwhile for U.S. companies to take advantage of these opportunities to engage with the global nuclear watchdog.
However, even for domestic projects, U.S. SMR firms should not abandon caution. Although domestic deals do not fall under direct IAEA purview, SMR developers have a direct stake in ensuring their products are safe from climate-related disasters and other accidents, as well as secure from outside risks or insider threats. While the NRC is responsible in theory for establishing licensing and regulatory procedures to bolster physical security and safety, the U.S. nuclear industry should take the initiative and integrate these principles into its designs, akin to tech developers’ promises to integrate safety protocols into their AI models. Private regulation via standards set by international industry groups, such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), could provide an alternative option for firms to demonstrate their commitment to safety and security.
While the commercial viability of small modular reactors is yet to be fully proven, it must not come at the expense of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation safeguards. Much work still needs to be done in order to balance these priorities and ensure that SMRs are ultimately beneficial to society. The companies developing them should spearhead this work.
Dan Zhukov is a Program Coordinator at the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab, coordinating the Lab’s research and wargaming portfolios. He holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London, and a BA in Political Science and History from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Lindsay Rand is a postdoctoral fellow at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation and a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds an MPP and PhD from the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, an MS in nuclear health physics from Georgetown University, and a BA in physics from Carleton College.
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