Venezuela’s army is far larger than Guyana’s. But Caracas might achieve better results with deniable “gray zone” attacks against its eastern neighbor than with an outright invasion.
A border skirmish has erupted between a well-armed Venezuelan gang and the Armed Forces of Guyana in the disputed, oil-rich, sparsely populated region of Essequibo. Six Guyanese troops were reportedly injured in the clash.
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is claiming that Guyana is using the incident for “political gain.” Weeks before this incident occurred, the Guyanese government accused the Venezuelan Navy of illegally approaching an ExxonMobil oil facility in a disputed offshore area.
Caracas denied those accusations.
Venezuela Has Wanted Guyana’s Essequibo Region for Years
The recent back-and-forth between Guyana and Venezuela is not an isolated incident. Since 2015, when vast offshore oil deposits were discovered off the Essequibo region’s coastline, Venezuela has attempted to annex that area.
Venezuela’s dispute with Guyana over Essequibo was turbocharged by the discovery of oil, but it dates back to the nineteenth century. Caracas claims that the 1966 Geneva Agreement allows for them to claim Essequibo, while the Guyanese government counters that an 1899 ruling grants Essequibo to Guyana’s former colonial master, the United Kingdom.
At a time when irredentism is all the rage, from Ukraine to the Middle East to Taiwan, many have feared that Venezuela might try to go hard at Guyana—which, though rich in oil, is many times smaller and weaker than its western neighbor. And for the last two years, as Venezuela’s economy has sunk deeper into depression, the world has danced on what seems to be a knife’s edge as to whether Venezuela will attempt to gain a sudden windfall by annexing the vast oil deposits of Essequibo.
Marco Rubio and Nicolas Maduro Trade Threats
Recently, the Trump administration’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, visited Guyanese President Irfaan Ali. During his visit, Rubio was asked about America’s position on the ongoing dispute and whether the U.S. would abide by a Venezuelan annexation of Essequibo. Rubio answered that such an action by Maduro’s regime “would lead to a very bad day for the Venezuelan regime”—adding that the U.S. Navy has “proven its capability to get anywhere in the world.”
Braggadocio aside, there is little doubt in anyone’s mind that the Americans could not defeat the Venezuelan Armed Forces. But how fast would Washington react to a Venezuelan run on Essequibo—especially if Caracas employed its vast network of transnational criminal organizations to conduct “gray zone” operations against the weak Guyanese government? What might a Venezuelan invasion of Guyana really look like?
The Size of Venezuela’s Army
Venezuela’s army has around 123,000 active personnel and possesses a variety of Soviet-era, Russian, and Chinese equipment that could be mobilized for an invasion across the jungle and riverine terrain of the Guyana border.
For example, Venezuela has approximately 200 Main Battle Tanks (MBTS), notably Russian T-72B1V and older Soviet T-62s in varying states of repair. With that said, the jungle environment of Essequibo might make these older, likely poorly maintained systems far less effective than they’d ordinarily be.
Remember, during the 2008 diplomatic crisis with Colombia, Venezuela deployed their tanks to the border, but these systems were visibly in disrepair. According to A.J. Manuzzi of Responsible Statecraft, “poor maintenance rendered many of their gun sights inoperable.” Nor is Venezuela’s tank force the only branch of its military in poor shape. According to Manuzzi, “Lack of maintenance and parts reportedly have left much of their air force currently grounded,” too.
Still, Venezuela has lighter armored vehicles, such as the Russian-built BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle and the BTR-90 wheeled armored personnel carriers. These vehicles would be more maneuverable and suited for rapid advances or river crossings. Venezuela also has Chinese-built VN-4 four-by-four wheeled vehicles and Russian Uran-4320 trucks to support troop mobility.
Venezuela would likely move their artillery into the fight as well. The Venezuelan Armed Forces possess a variety of artillery systems, such as the Russian-made 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B and self-propelled 2S19 Msta-S that could deliver heavy barrages to soften Guyanese defenses. For more mobile operations, the Russian 2S9 Nona 120mm mortar system and BM-21 Grade 122mm multiple rocket launchers could provide flexible support in rugged terrain.
BMP-3s, BTR-80s, and infantry, supported by BM-21 rocket fire, could push Venezuelan troops across the border, using Mi-17 transport helicopters to airlift troops to key points, like Lethem or Takutu River.
Venezuela’s Sea Power in Action
The Venezuelan Navy could play a crucial role in any assault on Essequibo, particularly in securing offshore oil platforms or blockading Guyana’s vital ports. The Iranian-made Peykaap-III missile boats, equipped with anti-ship missiles (possibly the Iranian Nasr or C-802 derivatives) and torpedoes could be deployed.
These fast, stealthy vessels could target Guyanese maritime assets or oil infrastructure. Additionally, Venezuela operates six Vosper Thornycroft patrol boats, some armed with the Otomat Mk 2 missiles, though their operational status remains uncertain due to ongoing maintenance issues.
Venezuela’s four Capana-class landing ships and smaller landing craft could facilitate troop deployments along Guyana’s coast or rivers, supported by marine infantry units. However, these assets are aging and their readiness is in doubt. Similarly, the Venezuelan Navy has two Type 209/1300 diesel-electric submarines, the Sábalo and Caribe, acquired from Germany in the 1970s, but they are thought to be non-operational due to neglect.
Venezuela’s Air Force—a Spent Force?
As for Venezuela’s air forces, they have between twelve and sixteen Russian Su-30MKV multirole fighters, armed with R-77 and R-27 air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions like the Kh-29. These systems could be used to conduct airstrikes or establish air superiority over Guyana’s nonexistent air defenses. With the Su-30MKVs as well as Venezuela’s Mi-35M attack helicopters, they could bomb Guyana’s limited military outposts and oil facilities, while those Peykaap-III missile boats targeted offshore platforms.
Venezuela operates a fleet of Russian Mi-17V-5 transport helicopters that could be used to move troops and supplies into Essequibo’s more remote areas. Mi-35M attack helicopters armed with rockets and anti-tank missiles could provide close-air support for invading Venezuelan forces.
And let’s not forget about the growing presence of drones. Notably, Venezuela has access to Iran’s Mohajer-2 drones, which could be used for reconnaissance and limited strike missions.
But this assumes a conventional attack on Essequibo.
What If Venezuela Goes for an Unconventional Attack?
Given the various states of disrepair in the Venezuelan Armed Forces, and the fact that Caracas spends so much time developing its transnational criminal organizations and paramilitary forces, a better move by Venezuela would likely be a gray zone attack on Essequibo over a protracted period of time.
For instance, Venezuela could deploy smaller paramilitary and special forces units to seize Guyanese outposts, then use propaganda to control the narrative globally, rather than risk everything in a conventional assault. This approach has been used to great effect in other regions—Russia’s “little green men” paving the way to its annexation of Crimea in 2014 as one notable example.
And South America, specifically Venezuela, has become a focal point of Russia’s Wagner Group, with the Maduro regime relying heavily on the Russian mercenaries to provide regime security. Caracas could easily hire the Wagner mercenaries to assist in their bid to claim Essequibo.
In such a campaign, very few resources in terms of vehicles and aircraft would be needed. And by keeping the fight confined to these gray zone tactics, Caracas would maintain plausible deniability. In the event of a conventional strike, the United States would surely come to Guyana’s aid—to Caracas’ peril.
But in an unconventional, protracted campaign, maybe not. And short of a major U.S. military intervention on behalf of the Guyanese, a Venezuela attempt to annex Essequibo would likely succeed—fundamentally altering the region’s geopolitics forever.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / StringerAL.
