Greenland’s minerals are drawing renewed U.S. interest, but Arctic conditions, local opposition, and processing and refining challenges make near-term gains unlikely.
Since returning to office in January 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to control Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark. This week, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, and Vice President J.D. Vance are visiting Greenland and are expected to tour a U.S. military base. In the wake of the Trump administration’s interest in accessing Ukraine’s minerals, much has been written on Greenland’s vast mineral wealth and the administration’s interest in securing it for American interests. Vice President J.D. Vance and Donald Trump Jr. have both publicly expressed interest in helping Greenland develop its “great natural resources.” But these statements reveal a potential lack of understanding of the complexities and time commitment associated with mining in the Arctic. While accessing Greenland’s mineral wealth will not help the United States in its rivalry with China over critical mineral supply chains in the short or even medium term, Greenland still plays an important role as an entry point for potential Arctic riches, important shipping routes, and great power struggles.
Greenland’s “Great” Resources
Greenland is home to a variety of critical minerals, including rare earth elements (REEs), uranium, zinc, and nickel. These materials are essential for modern technologies, including renewable energy infrastructure, defense systems, and high-tech manufacturing. But as in Ukraine, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the mere presence of minerals does not mean they are economically viable. Part of the challenge lies in Greenland’s factor endowments, including its geology, climate, and long distances to market, which cannot be adjusted. Structural conditions, including a lack of infrastructure, a small labor market, community opposition, and global market fluctuations, may be improved but make the economic viability of mining in Greenland difficult. Finally, even if the United States were able to viably source minerals from Greenland, the real hurdle to a secure U.S. mineral supply chain lies in the ability to process and refine them.
Mining is an extremely energy-intensive industry, and deposits are often in remote areas, which raises a host of issues related to transportation and infrastructure. Globally, the mining sector has a workforce problem that is exacerbated in remote areas with small labor markets. Greenland has a tiny population of approximately 56,000, and it is difficult to attract qualified candidates to work on mining projects in such locations.
Local opposition to mining remains a significant factor in Greenland’s resource development. Many Greenlanders are concerned about the environmental impact of mining, particularly radioactive waste from uranium extraction and contamination of water sources from mining runoff. These concerns are not arbitrary—three legacy mine sites in Greenland caused significant metal pollution due to a lack of environmental studies and regulations. Studies show that fish, mussels, and seaweed in these areas are still testing positive for toxins deposited in the 1970s. Greenland’s economy is heavily reliant on fishing, and there is strong resistance to any industrial activity that could threaten marine ecosystems. In recent years, public pushback has led to the rejection of major mining projects, including a proposed rare earth and uranium mine at Kvanefjeld in the far south of Greenland, which was halted due to environmental concerns and political opposition.
Much of the renewed interest in Greenland’s resources stems from the assumption that climate change has or will render mineral extraction of Arctic resources viable. Indeed, melting ice opens up new areas for exploration, but it also destabilizes permafrost, creating new challenges in infrastructure and transportation. Moreover, unpredictable weather patterns and glacial movements further afield can complicate large-scale mining operations.
Greenland: A History of Resource Dreams
This is not the first time that foreign powers have attempted to develop Greenland’s mineral resources. During the twentieth century, mining activity was limited due to significant economic, environmental, and political barriers, and only a few projects achieved commercial success. One famous success was the cryolite mine at Ivittuut on the west coast of Greenland, which was crucial in supplying the mineral for aluminum production in World War II but closed in 1987 after it became unprofitable.
Like today, after World War Two, there was an intense focus on uranium resources for military and civilian applications. In 1946, the United States desired to buy Greenland after U.S. geologists conducted secret and poorly documented geological surveys. Denmark resisted these overtures and began state-driven uranium exploration in Greenland in 1953, leading to the confirmation of uranium at Kvanefjeld in 1958. Uranium exploration halted in 1985 when Greenland left the European Economic Community, and the Danish government passed a resolution banning nuclear power plants.
Throughout the twentieth century, mining in Greenland developed in fits and starts, with many mines ultimately shutting due to a lack of investment. In recent years, the renewed attention on minerals, in particular on rare earth elements, has brought investment back to Greenland. In 2021, Australian mining company Greenland Minerals Ltd. attempted to revive the Kvanefjeld project but faced significant opposition from local communities due to concerns over radioactive waste and environmental degradation. That same year, Greenland’s government implemented a ban on uranium mining, halting the project. Other projects, including the Citroen Zinc Project and the Isua Iron Ore Project, struggled to advance due to market conditions, logistical and bureaucratic challenges, and financial constraints.
The Processing and Refining Challenge
Even if the challenges we have outlined were addressed, accessing minerals does not mitigate U.S. mineral supply chain problems. Currently, China heavily dominates the global refining and processing of rare earth elements, which means that without setting up intermediary steps along the value chain, Greenland’s output could end up being transported to Chinese facilities. Thus, accessing minerals in places like Greenland does little to address the strategic asymmetry with China with which the Trump administration is rightly concerned.
The natural policy option would be to pursue ally-shoring of processing and refining facilities based in Greenland or other friendly states closer to final markets. However, the logistical and environmental challenges facing the mining sector in the Arctic also apply to refineries. As a result, it may be more viable to transport raw materials to existing facilities in Canada, the United States, or Europe. Canada has extensive mining sites and processing capabilities, including a number of smelting facilities along the eastern seaboard and one at Long Harbour that processes base metals, including nickel, copper, and cobalt. Given the current political context, however, it may be challenging to persuade the Canadians to participate in the ally-shoring of minerals for the advancement of U.S. interests.
For centuries, great powers and foreign firms have eyed Greenland’s riches. Mineral extraction and mining have proceeded sporadically for over a century, but the structural impediments to commercial viability remain despite a rapidly melting Arctic. As evidenced by the recent executive order, “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production,” the Trump administration is concerned with addressing Chinese control of mineral supply chains, a serious challenge to American prosperity and security. But in the near future, and even in the medium term, securing access to Greenland’s minerals will do little to meet this challenge.
Emily J. Holland is the research director and an assistant professor at the Russia Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, as well as a former deputy political advisor on critical undersea infrastructure at NATO MARCOM.
Joshua Busby is a professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. From 2021 to 2023, he served as a senior advisor for climate at the U.S. Department of Defense.
Morgan D. Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute and a professor of public policy at the Colorado School of Mines.
Image: Nigel Jarvis/Shutterstock.com
