Given the Pentagon’s antipathy toward the A-10, its proponents should offer meaningful ways to keep it relevant in the modern era—such as the incorporation of unmanned aerial drones.
It’s undoubtedly one of the greatest warplanes in America’s otherwise declining, unaffordable, and nigh-unmanageable warplane fleet. The Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II—more commonly known as the A-10 Warthog—is a Close-Air Support (CAS) warplane that first flew for the United States Air Force in 1977.
But the Warthog is so much more than just a CAS bird. It is a full-blown aerial tank—a personnel killer that can loiter over battlefields for protracted periods of time, protecting U.S. servicemen engaged in intense ground combat.
Brrrrrrt: The A-10 Is a Flying Cannon
That’s because the A-10 is built around a massive 30mm GAU-8 Avenger cannon that puts lethality and endurance over speed or stealth. Born out of the hard lessons learned from the Vietnam War, when fast jets like the third-generation F-4 Phantom II struggled to deliver precise, low-altitude strikes against entrenched North Vietnamese forces, the Air Force launched the A-X (Attack Experimental) program to develop a dedicated ground-attack warplane.
Fairchild Republic’s design beat out Northrop’s YA-9 in a 1972 fly-off, and the first A-10s rolled out in 1975, entering service two years later. Fairchild Republic ceased to exist in 1984, and in 1987, Northrop (today Northrop Grumman) took over the production line.
The A-10 Warthog’s Impressive Record of Service
The A-10 missed the end of the Vietnam War by two years. But its service would redefine the way the United States Air Force did CAS mission sets for decades. The Warthog’s combat debut took place during the Gulf War in 1991, where it would go on to fly 8,100 sorties and destroy over 900 Iraqi tanks, 2,000 Iraqi military vehicles, and 1,200 artillery pieces.
To put that in perspective, in 1991, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army possessed the fourth-largest military in the world, and its equipment was considered to be among the very best Soviet platforms in existence. But the A-10 showed that it cut through Iraqi Soviet-provided armor—all while shrugging off Soviet-type anti-aircraft fire—like a hot knife through butter.
The A-10 would continue to prove itself in the various post-Cold War conflicts the United States found itself embroiled in.
A-10s have a maximum speed of 420 miles per hour and can cruise at 340 mph. The bird’s range is 800 miles, extendable with external fuel tanks or midair refueling. They have an operational ceiling of 45,000 feet, though they typically do their best work below 1,000 feet. The plane originally cost $18.8 million per unit (around $90 million in 2025 dollars), with operating costs around $20,000 per flight hour—relatively cheap compared to other warplanes in America’s arsenal.
Despite its battlefield successes, the Air Force keeps trying to retire the plane and replace it with the newer F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane. The claim by its detractors is that the Warthog is obsolete against modern air defenses.
But that claim doesn’t pass the smell test. After all, the backbone of the Air Force’s primary long-range strategic bomber force is the B-52 Stratofortress—which has flown the unfriendly skies since Harry S. Truman was president of the United States!
Why Not Pair the A-10 With Drones?
The Pentagon’s antipathy toward the A-10 is well-known, and unlikely to change. Instead of arguing with Big Blue, then, proponents of the aircraft should offer meaningful ways to keep it relevant in the modern era. One such alternative would be to incorporate unmanned aerial combat systems (UCAS) with the iconic A-10.
Imagine pairing an A-10 with UCAS drones like the Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie. Equipped with missiles or electronic warfare payloads, these drones could easily suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) or engage secondary targets, allowing the A-10 to concentrate its cannon and bombs on primary threats.
Think about it. In a hypothetical scenario, say against Russian armor—an unpleasant, though distinctly possible, prospect in the years to come—an A-10 could blast Russian tanks while its XQ-58A drone wingman jams enemy radar.
Alternatively, an A-10 could be partnered with smaller, expendable drones that would swarm enemy defenses, drawing fire away from the A-10. This tactic echoes Israel’s use of the Firebee drone decoys against Egyptian air defenses during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In that instance, all those decades ago, the Israelis’ rudimentary drones were able to exhaust Egypt’s Soviet-provided missile batteries, before conventional aircraft deployed the killing stroke against them. In a similar scenario today, an A-10 employing expendable swarms of drones against enemy air defenses could exploit the chaos created and strike with relative impunity, leveraging its legendary durability to mop up whatever the drones disrupted.
Another function the loitering, heavily armored, well-armed, survivable A-10 could serve could be as a command-and-control hub, directing a fleet of drones via datalinks. In fact, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) tinkered with this concept in 2015 with their Persistent Close Air Support (PCAS) program. In that experiment, DARPA used an A-10 to coordinate strikes with ground controllers and unmanned systems. A Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) on the ground could designate targets via tablet, with drones relaying data to the A-10 for final approval and execution.
And during DARPA’s PCAS tests a decade ago, A-10s functioning in this command-and-control role achieved precision strikes within six minutes of the request. Not bad for a fifty-year-old bird.
Overcoming Anti-A-10 Sentiment in the Pentagon
These ideas are unlikely to gain purchase as long as the Air Force remains incorrigibly hostile to the A-10’s continued existence. Elements within the Pentagon bureaucracy seek to cut the A-10 in order to fund more F-35 development—and, eventually, the development of the even more fantastical Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.
But there are tremendous downsides to this approach. The F-35 and NGAD programs are hugely expensive. Their complexity means fewer units available. And the scarcity of these units means that the cost of losing and replacing them—a distinct possibility even outside wartime, as seen from recent F-35 crashes—is far greater than it should be.
The A-10, on the other hand, is relatively cheap and has an incredibly successful combat history. Discarding it in the name of progress is irresponsible—especially since the revolution in drone technology means that even older systems like the A-10 can get a new lease on life. As the Pentagon faces increasing budgetary constraints, having affordable but effective platforms—regardless of age—seems like the smarter, cost-effective move.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / JJW Photography.
