The Helldiver’s poor manufacturing was a superficial problem relative to its fundamentally flawed design. The aircraft was simply built wrong.
The Curtiss SB2C Helldiver was built to replace the Douglas SBD Dauntless, a World War II dive bomber that had earned praise for its performance—particularly at the Battle of Midway, in which the earlier aircraft was credited (along with the Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bomber) with sinking four Japanese aircraft carriers. But the Helldiver suffered from production delays, which prevented it from making much impact until the end of the way—and from performance problems, which prevented the aircraft from earning the same degree of respect the Dauntless had enjoyed.
Introducing the Curtiss SB2C Helldiver
Between 1943 and 1945, over 7,000 SB2C Helldivers were built. Initially, the aircraft displayed poor handling characteristics—earning a damning report from the waste-focused Truman Committee and the ire of pilots and aircraft commanders alike.
The Helldiver was much larger than the Dauntless, and improved, in theory, for its ability to operate from the latest aircraft carriers and carry more armament. The Helldiver also featured an internal bomb bay, which reduced the drag that carrying heavy armament externally can cause.
But the Helldiver had problems, too. Most notably, the aircraft suffered from structural weakness, poor handling, directionally instability, and a tendency to stall. Production proved a slow-go, as Curtiss worked to amend the various design flaws.
When the Helldiver finally did join the Navy fleet, the aircraft, nicknamed “Beast,” was maligned for its size, weight, poor handling, and reduced range. One on-the-nose example of the Helldiver’s shortcomings occurred in 1944, during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, when 45 Helldivers that had been launched from beyond their limited range ran out of fuel while returning to their carrier.
The Helldiver was also a maintenance queen. Curtiss had done a poor job manufacturing the aircraft, whose low quality production was evident to the operators. The electric propeller and the complex hydraulic system were especially finicky, often requiring extra maintenance to keep the Helldiver airworthy.
But the Helldiver’s poor manufacturing was a superficial problem relative to its fundamentally flawed design. The aircraft was simply built wrong. In order to fit it onboard an aircraft carrier, it was given a fuselage that was too short, causing longitudinal instability. And the Helldiver’s aileron response was poor, meaning the aircraft was difficult to maneuver under 90 knots. Because the required speed during final approach on an aircraft carrier landing was 85 knots, this meant the Helldiver was hard to control while landing aboard an aircraft carrier—the time when the pilot most needs their aircraft to be controllable and reliable.
No, the Helldiver never quite worked out as planned—and the failure diminished the status of the Curtiss-Wright aerospace company. Still, the Helldiver still contributed to the final push, participating in battles over the Marianas, Philippines, Taiwan, Iwo Jima, Ryukyu Islands, and Okinawa. It was retired from active duty U.S. squadrons in 1947. Today, only a handful of surviving examples can be found on display—and, mercifully, almost none of them still fly.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.
Image: Shutterstock / jgorzynik.
