China’s deep-sea mining deal with the Cook Islands raises the stakes in critical mineral competition, with the United States at risk of falling behind.
In February, the Cook Islands announced a key deal with China: a five-year agreement on deep sea exploration of marine minerals. While the deal does not yet include full mining permits, it establishes a framework for the likely Chinese exploitation of the rich seabed resources of this small archipelago in the South Pacific. This is not an isolated commercial arrangement, but rather, it signals a strategic inflection point of marine minerals becoming a new axis of geopolitical competition, one on which the United States is disengaged and falling rapidly behind. On land, Chinese mineral dominance is all but assured in the short to medium term, but under the sea, it is not too late for bold action to help achieve American mineral dominance.
Global competition for critical minerals is intensifying as converging technological transformations fundamentally increase resource demand. All energy types require ever-growing quantities of copper, nickel, cobalt, rare earth elements, and other alloys for electric vehicle batteries, transmission lines, renewable energy installations, liquefied natural gas infrastructure, and nuclear plants. The International Energy Agency projects that clean energy mineral demand alone could increase by 400 to 600 percent by 2040. Concurrently, the rapid growth of data centers for artificial intelligence demands similar minerals. Defense technologies also depend on secure supply chains for strategic resources. The United States increasingly recognizes the role of minerals in creating Great Powers.
However, terrestrial extraction rates are not sufficient to keep up. Declining ore grades, environmental limitations, social opposition, and geopolitical vulnerabilities all limit the ability to expand terrestrial mines at the rates needed while also maintaining national supply security.
Deep Sea Resources and Governance
The deep seabed represents one of Earth’s last unexplored resource domains, containing vast polymetallic nodules, seafloor massive sulfides, and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts. These formations contain concentrated deposits of copper, nickel, cobalt, manganese, and rare earth elements—often at substantially higher grades than terrestrial equivalents. Over the past decade, technological advances in robotics, underwater vehicles, exploration data science, and materials processing have transformed DSM from a possibility to an imminent reality. Dozens of exploitation contracts have proved these resources can be gathered.
Resource rights for marine minerals fall under the governance framework of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Broadly, UNCLOS established two ownership regimes: states have resource rights for seabed minerals in their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and expanded continental shelves, while all other resources are governed as the High Seas by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).
While most nations are signatories to UNCLOS, the United States has not signed it, in part due to Senate objections to the international governance of High Seas resources. Unfortunately, the most attractive near-term deep-seabed mineral deposit, the expansive and dense polymetallic nodule fields of the Clarion Clipperton Zone located between California and Hawaii, falls into ISA jurisdiction. The United States cannot sponsor companies to get permits for this area, precluding its participation in the marine resources practically on its doorstep. The lack of ratification is also harming U.S. domestic resource interests, most recently in the form of Russian and Chinese objections to an expanded continental shelf claim in the strategic Arctic Ocean.
The United States’s objections are not without merit. Despite UNCLOS being signed decades ago and work on a regulatory framework starting in the early 2010s, the ISA has yet to finalize a regulatory framework for exploitation permits. Key sticking points include an inability to define a financial royalty scheme envisioned by UNCLOS, environmental objections, and obstructionism from states with significant terrestrial mineral deposits.
In the absence of an ISA framework for the High Seas, marine minerals ambitions are turning to exclusive economic zones, where coastal states enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. Norway made headlines in 2024 when it opened an area for mining permits, although procedural concerns have delayed further action. Other states with marine mineral resources examining domestic production include Japan, Brazil, and the Cook Islands. Of all states with EEZ marine minerals, the Cook Islands likely has the most dense high-grade polymetallic nodule deposits, making it the holder of the most attractive non-ISA resource deposits. High nodule density on the seafloor dramatically improves the economics of commercial collection, while the Cook Islands nodules contain especially high concentrations of cobalt, in global terms the rarest of the four metals (manganese, nickel, copper, cobalt) typically found in seafloor nodules.
China and the Cook Islands
China’s agreement with the Cook Islands is a continuation of a systematic approach to secure and dominate mineral resources globally. China has significant interests and influence in deep-sea mining, holding the most ISA exploration permits and conducting extensive activities to develop mining technology and prepare for large-scale production. The nation’s Belt and Road Initiative and other bilateral agreements have established controlling interests in strategic mineral deposits across Africa, Latin America, and now the Pacific. The nation has monopolized the processing of most mineral types, refining around 78 percent of the world’s battery-grade cobalt chemicals and 74 percent of battery nickelchemicals. And China is actively using this resource power as a means of influence, most recently by imposing export bans on tungsten, gallium, and other critical minerals key to American and allied defense industries.
These actions in the sea also build on China’s recent incredible growth in shipbuilding for military and commercial uses. A recent CSIS report notes: “In 2024 alone, [one Chinese shipbuilder] produced more commercial vessels by tonnage than the United States has since World War II.”
The Cook Islands deal—focusing on technology transfer, logistics support, and ecosystem research—fits neatly into this paradigm. By bypassing the ISA governance gridlock, China is positioning itself to be the first global producer of marine minerals, laying the foundation for a continued stranglehold on critical mineral supply. In forging a partnership with a small, strategically located nation, China is effectively extending its reach into an arena that not only promises vast mineral wealth but also enhances its geopolitical leverage. Domestically, though, the deal was so unpopular it forced an unsuccessful attempt at a no-confidence vote in the Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown.
The Pacific Ocean, long dominated by Western interests, is fast becoming a contested space. In 2019, China negotiated the Solomon Islands’s diplomatic recognition of China over Taiwan. In 2022, China and the Solomons negotiated a security pact, challenging the islands’ historically intimate government-to-government ties with Australia. These controversial decisions have triggered intense protests across the archipelago over recent years. The Cook Islands is in free association with New Zealand—when viewed in a broader context, the marine minerals deal is similarly part of a longer Chinese strategy of isolating Wellington from Pacific nation partners. Indeed, the marine minerals deal was announced the same week that China conducted live-fire naval exercises between Australia and New Zealand. The Cook Islands announcement has upstaged the United States’s own diplomatic outreach, which had culminated in the official establishment of diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands in September 2023.
Not only do the Cook Islands offer attractive EEZ resources, but they also sit on the sea lines of communication between the U.S. and its allies, Australia and New Zealand. Further, the Cook Islands EEZ includes vital submarine telecommunications lines connecting the North American continent with Oceania. Without a clear U.S. response, Chinese sway may take hold in this vital nation. Yet, there is still an opportunity to energetically match Chinese overtures. Cook Islands citizens are nervous about losing New Zealand citizen status conferred via constitutional ties between the two countries—a consideration that heavily motivated much of the public opposition to the recent deals.
A Pathway Toward American Leadership
The United States finds itself disadvantaged and falling behind in marine minerals production, as it has on land, at its geopolitical peril. The continued non-ratification of UNCLOS prevents private sector access to the best oceanic resources and stymies maritime innovation. This self-imposed limitation generates multiple strategic vulnerabilities: the United States cannot sponsor American companies to secure exploitation contracts through the ISA, U.S. officials cannot participate in developing the regulatory framework, and the United States lacks formal mechanisms to counter Chinese influence within international seabed governance structures. Without regulatory certainty, private sector companies are forced overseas. Or worse, startups avoid formation altogether.
Recent policy developments suggest a growing awareness of this strategic deficit. The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act called for a report on domestic processing capabilities for polymetallic nodules. The United States is accelerating continental shelf expansion claims, most recently in the Arctic. Last year, a bipartisan group of hundreds of former officials and flag officers called for the ratification of UNCLOS so American companies can compete for deep-sea mining in the High Seas.
More action is needed. Building on other recommendations, we recommend the following U.S. marine minerals strategy:
- Domestic resource development. The United States must accelerate geological surveys of its exclusive economic zones and extended continental shelves to identify and quantify marine mineral reserves. This would include a modernized and streamlined regulatory framework for domestic exploration and exploitation activities.
- Unleashing private sector deep sea innovation. A dedicated research and development program focused on deep-sea mining technologies, underwater vehicles, and onshore processing techniques is essential. Public-private partnerships accelerate technology commercialization and domestic competitiveness.
- Deal-making with strategic partners. To counter Chinese resource strategies, the United States should execute marine minerals deals with Greenland, Norway, Japan, and South Pacific nations like Tonga, Nauru, and the Cook Islands. Outside of countries’ EEZs, the U.S. government can partner with ISA member countries to sponsor U.S. companies to explore minerals on the High Seas. These partnerships should open resources to joint development, emphasizing equitable benefit-sharing.
- Unlocking the High Seas by joining UNCLOS. The United States should reconsider its position on UNCLOS ratification to secure direct participation in ISA governance and permitting processes. This would require strong countering of Chinese influence within the international regulatory framework while enabling American companies to compete for exploration contracts under fair conditions.
The strategic implications are clear. The United States possesses scant opportunities like this to strengthen supply chains for four critical minerals simultaneously by pursuing a single mineral resource. Nations that secure access to marine minerals will possess significant advantages in next-generation technologies—from clean energy infrastructure to quantum computing—while also directly advancing maritime robotics and undersea capabilities with potent military applications. The Cook Islands-China agreement constitutes more than a minor diplomatic development in a remote Pacific archipelago. It represents part of a larger geopolitical move by China to wrestle control of the Pacific, with marine minerals constituting a key axis of effort. Just as Sputnik galvanized American technological mobilization during the Space Race, this development should catalyze a comprehensive policy response to ensure mineral security.
Deep-sea mining is not just about minerals; it is about the future of global maritime order.
Alex Gilbert is the Vice President of Regulation at Zeno Power Systems, a fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and a PhD candidate in Space Resources at the Colorado School of Mines.
Seaver Wang is Director of Climate and Energy at the Breakthrough Institute and holds a PhD in Earth and Ocean Sciences from Duke University.
Morgan Bazilian is Professor and Director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines.
Image: Moissa S Hananto / Shutterstock.com
